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Abstract
& Misattribution refers to the act of attributing a memory or
idea to an incorrect source, such as successfully remembering a
bit of information but linking it to an inappropriate person or
time [Jacoby, L. L., Kelley, C., Brown, J., & Jasechko, J. (1989).
Becoming famous overnight: Limits on the ability to avoid
unconscious influences of the past. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 56, 326–338; Schacter, D. L. (1999). The
seven sins of memory: Insights from psychology and cognitive
neuroscience. American Psychologist, 54, 182–203; Schacter,
D. L. (2001). The seven sins of memory: How the mind forgets
and remembers. Boston: Houghton Mifflin]. Cognitive studies
have suggested that misattribution errors may occur in the
absence of recollection for the details of an initial encounter
with a stimulus, but little is known about the neural basis of
this memory phenomenon. Here we used functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine the hypothesized role of
recollection in counteracting the illusory truth effect, a
misattribution error whereby perceivers systematically overrate
the truth of previously presented information. Imaging was
conducted during the encoding and subsequent judgment of
unfamiliar statements that were presented as true or false.
Event-relatedfMRIanalyseswereconditionalizedasafunctionof
subsequent performance. Results demonstrated that encoding
activation in regions previously associated with successful
recollection—including the hippocampus and the ventrolateral
prefrontal cortex (PFC)—correlated with the successful avoid-
ance of misattribution errors, providing initial neuroimaging
support for earlier cognitive accounts of misattribution. &
INTRODUCTION
Event-related fMRI has provided a new way to examine
the neural correlates of episodic encoding by allowing
examination of the brain regions in which activity pre-
dicts the memorial fate of individual items. In such
subsequent memory designs (first developed in electro-
physiological research; see Paller & Wagner, 2002, for
discussion), brain activation during the encoding of
subsequently remembered items is compared to activa-
tion during the encoding of subsequently forgotten
items, allowing the identification of brain regions in
which processing correlates with the successful forma-
tion of episodic memories on a trial-by-trial basis. This
research has consistently identified regions of the ven-
trolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) and medial-temporal
lobe (MTL) as contributing to memory formation (Da-
vachi, Mitchell, & Wagner, 2003; Davachi & Wagner,
2002; Paller & Wagner, 2002; Strange, Otten, Josephs,
Rugg, & Dolan, 2002; Otten, Henson, & Rugg, 2001;
Kirchhoff, Wagner, Maril, & Stern, 2000; Henson, Rugg,
Shallice, Josephs, & Dolan, 1999; Brewer, Zhao, Des-
mond, Glover, & Gabrieli, 1998; Wagner, Schacter, et al.,
1998).
However, as pointed out by a number of cognitive
theorists (Schacter, 1999, 2001; Greenwald & Banaji,
1995; Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, & Jasechko, 1989), memory
is more than just a simple matter of remembering or
forgetting past events. Schacter (1999, 2001) has recent-
ly discussed a number of additional ways in which
memory can prove fragile, from various kinds of memory
distortions to persistent memories of traumatic events.
Although relatively little is currently known about the
neural processes that either give rise to or prevent such
memory failures, researchers have very recently begun
to adapt the basic subsequent memory paradigm to
investigate the functional neuroanatomy of these phe-
nomena (Anderson, Ochsner, et al., 2004; Maril, Simons,
Mitchell, Schwartz, & Schacter, 2003; Maril, Wagner, &
Schacter, 2001).
In the current research, we extend the scope of these
earlier investigations to another form of memory failure,
that of misattribution. Misattribution refers to situations
in which one erroneously attributes a memory or idea to
an incorrect source, such as successfully remembering a
bit of information but linking it to an inappropriate
person, time, or place (Schacter, 1999, 2001; Johnson,
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alter their subjective judgments of a stimulus as a result
of its initial presentation. Among the best studied exam-
ples of this form of misattribution is the ‘‘illusory truth
effect,’’ whereby perceivers tend to increase their judg-
ments of the truth of information that had been pre-
sented earlier (Rahhal, May, & Hasher, 2002; Begg,
Robertson, Gruppuso, Anas, & Needham, 1996; Begg,
Anas, & Farinacci, 1992; Gilbert, Krull, & Malone, 1990;
Bacon, 1979; Hasher, Goldstein, & Toppino, 1977). For
example, Begg, Anas, et al. (1992) presented participants
with a series of statements that were identified as being
true, as being false, or without reference to the truth
value of the statement (because the statements referred
to obscure facts about the world, participants were
unlikely to know the actual truth value of each state-
ment). Subsequently, participants indicated their subjec-
tive sense of the veracity of both these previously
encountered as well as novel statements. The tendency
to judge old statements to be true was demonstrated by
two behavioral effects. First, participants more frequent-
ly judged the correct truth value of cued-true items than
that of cued-false items. That is, whereas cued-true items
were typically judged correctly as true, cued-false items
were more often judged incorrectly to be true than to be
false. Second, participants judged cued-neutral state-
ments (i.e., those for which no truth information was
provided during study) to be more true than novel
statements; that is, mere exposure to a statement in-
creased its truth value. These two behavioral results
together mark the illusory truth effect.
Cognitive explanations for this first manifestation of
the illusory truth effect (i.e., the tendency to misjudge
false items as true) have underscored the importance of
recollection to the successful avoidance of misattribu-
tion errors (Schacter, 1999; Johnson et al., 1993; Begg,
Anas, et al., 1992; Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby et al., 1989).
Specifically, these accounts have suggested that misat-
tribution errors are particularly likely under conditions
in which perceivers have little or no contextual recollec-
tion for the details surrounding their initial encounter
with a stimulus. For example, the illusory truth effect is
thought to occur when perceivers recognize that infor-
mation was encountered previously, but fail to recollect
whether it was presented as true or false. As a result,
perceivers may experience an item as being familiar and
attempt to link this subjective sense of familiarity to
some other feature of the item, such as its veracity. In
other words, in the absence of full-blown recollection,
perceivers are thought to attribute the familiarity of an
item to the truth value of the information it conveys.
The notion that recollection underlies the ability to
avoid judgment-based misattribution errors such as the
illusory truth effect is supported by observations that
illusory truth increases as source memory decreases. For
example, source memory is attenuated both by the in-
troduction of a secondary task during encoding or by
decreasing the discriminability of sources (Johnson et al.,
1993; Lindsay, 1990), and these manipulations have also
been shown to augment misattribution errors on illusory
truth paradigms (Begg, Anas, et al., 1992). Likewise,
analytic techniques designed to separate out the con-
tributions of recollection to memory performance—the
process dissociation procedure (Jacoby, 1991)—have
suggested that successful suppression of the illusory
truth effect correlates with the strength of recollection
(Begg, Anas, et al., 1992).
If the illusory truth effect can indeed be counteracted
by recollection, both successful encoding and judgment
of cued-false items should be associated with brain areas
previously identified in neuroimaging and patient stud-
ies of contextual recollection. Recent subsequent mem-
ory studies using fMRI (Ranganath, Yonelinas, et al.,
2004; Davachi et al., 2003; Henson, Rugg, et al., 1999)
have converged on a consistent set of brain regions in
which encoding activation correlates specifically with
subsequent recollection-based memory. This ‘‘neural
signature’’ of successful recollective encoding consists
of both the ventrolateral PFC (inferior frontal gyrus
[IFG] and operculum) as well as the hippocampus. For
example, Davachi et al. (2003) oriented participants to a
series of words in two different ways (either form an
image related to the word or read the word backwards).
Subsequently, participants performed a two-step recog-
nition task in which they were first asked to decide
whether each item was old or new; if the word was
judged to be old, the participant was further asked to
specify whether he or she had performed the ‘‘imagine’’
or ‘‘read backwards’’ task. This latter source memory
discrimination is thought to require recollection of the
study episode, whereas simple old/new discriminations
can be performed on the basis of other information,
such as the item’s relative familiarity. Subsequent mem-
ory analyses indicated that encoding activation in both
the left ventrolateral PFC and the hippocampus corre-
lated with later recollection of which orienting task had
been performed, but did not differentiate between old/
new recognition. That is, activation in the ventrolateral
PFC and the hippocampus during encoding correlated
specifically with subsequent recollection, and not simply
overall memory for the items. Encoding activation in
highly similar brain regions has been observed by other
researchers to correlate with recollection, as indexed by
correct source memory judgments (Ranganath, Yoneli-
nas, et al., 2004), as well as with ‘‘remember’’ responses
on the remember/know paradigm (Henson, Rugg, et al.,
1999).
There is currently less consensus regarding the brain
regions that accompany recollection during retrieval.
However, across a number of studies, tasks that require
access to recollective details have been associated with
greater activation (relative to retrieval tasks that can be
performed without recollection) in a distributed set of
brain regions that includes the ventrolateral PFC, the
Mitchell, Dodson, and Schacter 801superior frontal gyrus (SFG), the hippocampus, and left-
lateralized posterior parietal regions (Dobbins, Rice,
Wagner, & Schacter, 2003; Dobbins, Foley, Schacter, &
Wagner, 2002; Eldridge, Knowlton, Furmanski, Book-
heimer, & Engel, 2000; Ranganath, Johnson, & D’Espo-
sito, 2000; Henson, Rugg, et al., 1999; Henson, Shallice,
& Dolan, 1999; Rugg, Fletcher, Chua, & Dolan, 1999;
Nolde, Johnson, & D’Esposito, 1998; Wagner, Desmond,
Glover, & Gabrieli, 1998; Wagner, Poldrack, et al., 1998;
Petrides, Alivisatos, & Evans, 1995).
This earlier research supports specific predictions
about the brain regions that should be important for
successful avoidance of misattribution errors on the
illusory truth paradigm. In the current study, partici-
pants were scanned during encoding and subsequent
judgment of trivia statements that were cued as either
true or false or were associated with no truth informa-
tion. During the judgment phase of the experiment,
participants considered each of the statements and
indicated whether each should be considered true or
false (or that there was no basis to decide). The event-
related nature of the experimental design allowed us to
isolate neural activity during both encoding and judg-
ment as a function of cue type (false, true) as well as
subsequent judgment success. The theoretical perspec-
tive we have sketched suggests that to the extent that
(a) misattribution is attenuated by the presence of
recollection for the study episode and (b) later access
to recollection correlates with encoding activation in the
ventrolateral PFC and the hippocampus, then (c) encod-
ing activation in these two brain regions should correlate
with whether an item is subsequently subject to the
illusory truth effect (i.e., inappropriately judged to be
true). Because misattribution in illusory truth paradigms
is indexed by the tendency to misjudge cued-false
information to be true, we specifically expected encod-
ing activation in the ventrolateral PFC and the hippo-
campus would distinguish between cued-false items that
were later correctly judged to be false and those that
were subsequently misjudged to be true. In contrast,
because cued-true items can be correctly judged to be
true even in the absence of recollection (i.e., on the
basis of other stimulus features, such as item familiarity),
no such difference should be observed between correct-
ly judged and misjudged cued-true items.
Relatively little is known about the cognitive processes
that give rise to the second form of illusory truth, the
tendency to judge old items to be true in the absence of
any truth cues during encoding. Because participants
more frequently judge old items to be true (relative to
novel items) even when item recognition is near ceiling
(Bacon, 1979), it seems unlikely that this effect results
from the unavailability of recollection, and accordingly,
the scope of our predictions is restricted to information
cued as true or false. Nevertheless, to provide behavioral
confirmation that participants did, in fact, demonstrate
both forms of illusory truth, the current study included
items that were uncued during encoding (i.e., cued-
neutral items), even though we did not have specific
predictions about brain regions involved in processing
such stimuli.
1
Finally, we made a set of secondary predictions re-
garding the activations at retrieval. Because of the bias to
call familiar items true, cued-false items were expected
to involve greater activation of source information than
cued-true items, and should therefore engage brain
regions previously implicated in recollective retrieval.
Therefore, in line with earlier research, we expected that
the ventrolateral PFC, the SFG, the hippocampus, and
posterior parietal regions would be more activated for
items that required access to recollection (i.e., cued-false




The illusory truth effect is typically defined by two
patterns of behavioral results, both of which were
observed in the current study (Table 1). First, the
correct truth value was assigned to a greater proportion
of cued-true items (0.80) than cued-false items (0.58),
t(11) = 7.97, p =1 0
6. Second, despite the absence
of veracity information, a greater proportion of cued-
neutral statements (M = 0.53) were judged to be true
than novel statements (M = 0.29), t(11) = 10.13, p =
10
7. These behavioral results together confirm that the
current design succeeded in producing the illusory truth
effect.
fMRI Data: Encoding Phase
fMRI encoding data were conditionalized on the basis of
subsequent truth judgments. Specifically, each cued-
false and cued-true item was considered either correct
or incorrect as a function of whether it was later judged
false or true, resulting in 4 types of encoding trials: cued-
false/judged-false (FF), cued-false/judged-incorrect
(Fx), cued-true/judged-true (TT), and cued-true/
judged-incorrect (Tx). A statement was considered
correct if it was judged to be either ‘‘definitely’’ or
Table 1. Mean Proportion of Response Judgments by
Encoding Cue
Judgment Response
Encoding Cue ‘‘False’’ ‘‘Neutral’’ ‘‘True’’
False 0.58 0.16 0.26
Neutral 0.19 0.28 0.53
True 0.06 0.14 0.80
Novel 0.17 0.54 0.29
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coding (e.g., Responses 1 or 2 for a cued-false item), and
incorrect if it received any other response.
We adopted several complementary analytic strategies
to examine differences in neural activation among con-
ditions. First, we identified brain regions that were
significantly activated by the encoding task relative to
baseline, regardless of trial type (i.e., all encoding trials >
fixation) and subsequently interrogated these regions of
interest (ROIs) for differences between conditions. This
analysis provides a conservative method for examining
differences between conditions, as ROIs were defined in
a manner that was unbiased with regard to differences
among conditions. Brain areas that were significantly
activated by the encoding task included a number of loci
in the left ventrolateral PFC along the IFG, a more
focused region in the right IFG, left-lateralized superior
frontal gyrus, occipito-temporal cortex, MTL (including
the left hippocampus), and the bilateral occipital cortex.
ROI analyses demonstrated that encoding activation
associated with FF trials was significantly greater than
other trial types (i.e., FF > Fx  TT  Tx) in three re-
gions: left hippocampus and bilateral IFG (Figure 1A–C).
That is, encoding activation in the left hippocampus and
the bilateral IFG differentiated subsequent correct judg-
ments of cued-false statements (i.e., FF items) from
other item types and did not differentiate among correct
judgments of cued-true (TT) or incorrect judgments of
either kind (Fx or Tx items). No other difference be-
tween conditions was observed in this analysis in any
other brain region.
However, by restricting analysis to regions that were
activated by all or most conditions, this initial analysis
strategy was fairly conservative. For example, regions in
which some trial types were associated with ‘‘deactiva-
tions’’ below baseline would not be identified. To
protect against Type II errors, we also compared con-
ditions in a series of direct contrasts. A direct contrast of
FF > TT yielded a number of regions in which encoding
activation was differentially correlated with subsequent
correct judgments of cued-false statements compared
with cued-true statements: bilateral IFG, left operculum,
left MTL, left fusiform gyrus, and left occipital cortex
(Table 2). The reverse contrast, TT > FF, yielded no
brain regions, even at a relaxed statistical threshold of
p < .01, uncorrected. The contrast of FF > Fx yielded
activations in the right IFG, right fusiform gyrus, left
parahippocampal cortex, and right anterior hippocam-
pus/amygdala. No regions were observed in the contrast
of TT > Tx.
Finally, to confirm that predicted task differences
were obtained in the exact regions previously associated
with recollective encoding, we interrogated the same
ROIs reported in an earlier study of successful source
Figure 1. ROIs identified in the encoding phase of the experiment. Activations are rendered onto coronal slices of participants’ mean normalized
anatomical image. For each region, the hemodynamic time course of the BOLD response is displayed for encoding trials conditionalized by
subsequent truth judgments. Three regions that demonstrated differences between conditions are presented: (A) left IFG; (B) right IFG; (C) left
hippocampus. In addition, ROIs from an earlier study of recollective encoding (Davachi et al., 2003) were interrogated: (D) left operculum; (E) right
hippocampus; (F) left hippocampus. In all six regions, greater activation was associated with successfully encoded cued-false items (FF, solid closed
circles) than with incorrectly encoded cued-false items (Fx, dashed open circles), correctly encoded cued-true items (TT, solid closed triangles),o r
incorrectly encoded true items (Tx, dashed open triangles), i.e., a pattern of FF > Fx  TT  Tx.
Mitchell, Dodson, and Schacter 803memory encoding (Davachi et al., 2003). As reviewed
above, Davachi et al. demonstrated that encoding acti-
vation in a number of regions—left ventrolateral PFC
(both IFG and operculum regions), bilateral hippocam-
pus, and left parahippocampal cortex—correlated spe-
cifically with recollection, rather than other components
of recognition memory. Because these earlier results
provide an independent ‘‘neural signature’’ of recollec-
tive encoding, we examined the neural response in each
of these regions (i.e., precisely the same voxels) for the
current data. In each, encoding activation was signifi-
cantly greater for FF than for Fx, TT, or Tx trials (i.e.,
FF > Fx  TT  Tx). Figure 1 (panels D–F) displays
hemodynamic time courses for the left operculum and
bilateral hippocampus regions reported by Davachi et al.
fMRI Data: Judgment Phase
As for the encoding phase, several complementary
analyses were conducted on fMRI data from the judg-
ment phase of the experiment. We first identified brain
regions that were significantly activated by the judgment
task relative to baseline, regardless of trial type (i.e., all
judgment trials > fixation). These regions included all
those activated during encoding plus the bilateral pari-
etal cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and the
left occipito-temporal junction. We observed two pat-
t e r n so fd i f f e r e n c e sa m o n gt r i a lt y p e s .F i r s t ,i nt h e
bilateral IFG, bilateral SFG, and ACC, an equivalent
amount of activation was associated with FF and Fx
items (all p values > .25), which were both greater than
TT and Tx items (Table 3). In addition, Fx items showed
significantly greater activation than FF, TT, and Tx items
at two additional SFG loci. Interestingly, FF activation
was not significantly greater than Fx activation in any
region. This pattern of results was confirmed through a
direct contrast of FF > Fx, which yielded no brain
regions where activation was greater for FF than Fx
items, even at a relaxed statistical threshold ( p < .01,
uncorrected).
Although the speed with which participants judged FF
(2259 msec) and TT (2250 msec) items was very similar,
Fx (2717 msec) trials were judged significantly more
slowly than either of these other types of trials (both p
values < .05). To examine the possibility that Fx activa-
tion might reflect the relatively long reaction times
associated with these items, a subset of FF and Fx items
was matched for reaction time within each participant
(Ms of 2168 and 2096 msec, respectively). Four partic-
ipants had too few trials of at least one type (< 10)
to permit meaningful analyses with this RT-matched
set. For the remaining participants, no difference was
Table 2. Peak Voxel and Number of Voxels for ROIs
Demonstrating Time Course Differences between Conditions
during Encoding
Region x y z Voxels
FF > Fx  TT  Tx
Inf. frontal gyrus L 54 27 3 24
L 51 24 18 46
L 45 12 27 54
L 57 15 24 33
R 57 27 18 26
Med. temporal lobe L 30 15 15 20
L 21 33 01 9
L 27 27 21 39
FF > TT
Inf. frontal gyrus L 51 18 0 16
Med. temporal lobe L 30 9 15 13
FF > Fx
Inf. frontal gyrus R5 42 42 11 1
Parahipp. cortex L 24 39 21 30
Fusiform gyrus R4 2 51 21 21
Amygdala R 21 3 21 13
Note: The table lists brain regions in which a significant difference was
detected at encoding between any two conditions (cued-false/judged-
false [FF], cued-false/judged-incorrect [Fx], cued-true/judged-true
[TT], and cued-true/judged-incorrect [Tx] trials). For FF > Fx  TT
 Tx, ROIs were defined from the contrast of all encoding trials >
baseline and subsequently interrogated for differences between
conditions. FF > TT and FF > Fx report the results of direct contrasts
between those trial types. Coordinates are in MNI space. Inf. = inferior;
med. = medial; parahipp. = parahippocampal. Table 3. Peak Voxel and Number of Voxels for ROIs
Demonstrating Differences between Conditions during
Judgment
Region x y z Voxels
FF  Fx > TT  Tx
Inf. frontal gyrus L 51 24 27 48
L 57 21 18 38
R5 1 2 4 1 85 9
R4 8 1 5 2 13 5
Sup. frontal gyrus R 3 24 51 39
Ant. cingulate cortex L 9 21 39 39
Fx > FF  TT  Tx
Sup. frontal gyrus L 6 95 4 7 2
L 6 6 66 48
Note: The table lists ROIs in which a significant difference was detected
between any two conditions during the judgment phase. All ROIs were
identified from the contrast of all judgment trials > baseline and
subsequently interrogated for differences between conditions. Inf. =
inferior; sup. = superior; ant. = anterior.
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(SFG, bilateral IFG, ACC), including those regions orig-
inally demonstrating a pattern of Fx > FF. However, as
displayed in Figure 2, both left posterior parietal loci
(36, 60, 45; 33, 72, 36) demonstrated a pattern
consistent with successful retrieval of recollective source
information, that is, significantly greater retrieval activa-
tion for RT-matched FF items than Fx items (i.e., FF > Fx
 TT). Although Tx items were also associated with
significantly longer RTs (2871 msec) than other item
types, the small overall number of Tx items prevented a
comparable analysis for cued-true statements.
DISCUSSION
Activations at Encoding
Cognitive research has suggested that misattribution
errors can be avoided under conditions that support
recollection of the contextual details surrounding one’s
initial encounter with a stimulus. In the current study,
we indexed misattribution errors through the illusory
truth effect, explanations for which have suggested that
correct judgment of cued-false information (i.e., avoid-
ance of misattribution) requires such access to recol-
lective details. Accordingly, we predicted that the
successful encoding of cued-false statements (i.e., FF
items) would be associated with a pattern of neural
activity previously linked to recollection-based memory
encoding. Primary results demonstrated that FF items
were associated with greater activation (relative to Fx,
TT, or Tx items) in three brain regions: left and right
ventrolateral PFC (corresponding to IFG) as well as left-
lateralized hippocampus.
Together, these regions comprise the set of loci
observed by previous event-related fMRI studies that
have identified brain regions in which encoding activa-
tion correlates with successful memory (Davachi et al.,
2003; Davachi & Wagner, 2002; Paller & Wagner, 2002;
Strange et al., 2002; Otten, Henson, & Rugg, 2001;
Kirchhoff et al., 2000; Henson, Rugg, et al., 1999; Brewer
et al., 1998; Wagner, Schacter, et al., 1998). Consistent
with the notion that these regions contribute to en-
coding by specifically subserving recollection, almost all
of these studies have restricted imaging analyses to
items later associated with contextual recollection,
whether indexed by free recall (Strange et al., 2002);
items that are recognized with high confidence (Otten,
Henson, & Rugg, 2001; Kirchhoff et al., 2000; Wagner,
Schacter, et al., 1998); ‘‘remember’’ responses in the
remember/know procedure (Henson, Rugg, et al., 1999;
Brewer et al., 1998); or by accurate source memory
(Ranganath, Yonelinas, et al., 2004; Davachi et al.,
2003). Indeed, recent work that has attempted to disso-
ciate brain regions that contribute specifically to recol-
lective encoding from those that play a role in other
forms of memory (such as familiarity-based encoding)
has suggested the selectivity of these regions for en-
coding that subserves subsequent recollection (Ranga-
nath, Yonelinas, et al., 2004; Davachi et al., 2003). In the
current work, secondary analyses confirmed that FF
items were associated with greater encoding activation
(relative to other item types) in the exact same regions
linked by some of these earlier researchers to successful
recollective encoding.
The contributions of the left ventrolateral PFC to
memory encoding are thought to derive primarily from
its role in semantic processing. On the basis of extant
neuroimaging work, a number of theorists have sug-
gested that the processes subserved by the left PFC
might collectively be thought of as ‘‘semantic working
memory,’’ consisting of the selection, manipulation, and
integration of an item’s semantic meaning (Wagner,
Pare-Blagoev, Clark, & Poldrack, 2001; Buckner & Kout-
staal, 1998; Gabrieli, Poldrack, & Desmond, 1998; Wag-
ner, Schacter, et al., 1998), and that this region may
support elaborative memory encoding by contributing
to deep semantic analysis and selection of appropriate
verbal information. The contribution of the left ventro-
lateral PFC to this kind of semantic analysis may account
both for the frequent observations that the response in
this region is greater during deep, semantic encoding
tasks than more superficial ones (Cabeza & Nyberg,
2000) and that encoding activation in this region typi-
cally correlates with subsequent memory success for
verbal stimuli (Paller & Wagner, 2002).
In addition to the left ventrolateral PFC regions typ-
ically observed to correlate with recollective encoding,
we also obtained a region in the right ventrolateral PFC
that was differentially engaged for items that were not
subsequently subject to misattribution errors (FF items).
Encoding activation in similar right PFC regions has
been shown to correlate with subsequent memory for
nonverbal materials, such as pictures (Kirchhoff et al.,
Figure 2. In two regions of the left partietal cortex, greater activation
was observed for FF trials (solid, closed circles) than for Fx trials
(dashed open circles), demonstrating a retrieval success effect
for RT-matched trials. Fx trials did not differ from TT trials
(solid closed triangles). Data are displayed for the parietal region at
36, 60, 45. Because of the small number of Tx trials, these items
could not be RT-matched to other trial types.
Mitchell, Dodson, and Schacter 8052000; Brewer et al., 1998), but the right PFC is not
generally observed during the encoding of verbal mate-
rials of the sort used in the current study. However,
statements used in the current study were substantially
more complex stimuli than the single words that have
served as stimuli in many previous subsequent memory
studies, and the recruitment of PFC regions in both
hemispheres has been observed during sentence com-
prehension (e.g., Constable et al., 2004; Just, Newman,
Keller, McEleney, & Carpenter, 2004). Accordingly, given
recent observations that the processes engaged during
encoding critically determine which brain regions will
correlate with subsequent memory (Mitchell, Macrae, &
Banaji, 2004; Otten, Henson, & Rugg, 2002), right PFC
regions might be expected to contribute to successful
encoding for complex verbal materials, such as senten-
ces. An alternative possibility is that the statements used
in the current study conveyed information about a wide
range of topics, some of which may have prompted
pictorial encoding processes supported by the right
hemisphere (Kirchhoff et al., 2000; Brewer et al., 1998;
Kelley et al., 1998).
A critical role for the PFC in recollective memory has
also been suggested by the study of neuropsychological
patients. For example, patients with damage to the
frontal cortex have shown relative sparing of item rec-
ognition, but impaired use of source information that is
critical for recollective memory (Shimamura, Janowsky,
& Squire, 1990; Janowsky, Shimamura, & Squire, 1989).
These impairments are generally thought to reflect the
disruption of the strategic aspects of memory encoding
and retrieval, such as semantic elaboration or initiation
of appropriate retrieval searches (Shimamura et al.,
1990; Janowsky et al., 1989), and can result in height-
ened susceptibility to memory distortion (Schacter,
Curran, Galluccio, Milberg, & Bates, 1996).
In addition to the ventrolateral PFC, neuropsycholog-
ical, neuroimaging, and nonhuman animal research has
also suggested an important role for the hippocampus in
recollection. Although considerable controversy exists
regarding the precise contributions of the hippocampus
to recognition memory (Manns & Squire, 1999; Reed,
Hamann, Stefanacci, & Squire, 1997; Reed & Squire,
1997), patients with damage limited to the hippocampus
show particularly pronounced impairment when suc-
cessful performance requires recollection; the magni-
tude of their deficits is less clear when performance
requires only familiarity (Holdstock et al., 2002; Mayes,
Holdstock, Isaac, Hunkin, & Roberts, 2002; Yonelinas
et al., 2002; Baddeley, Vargha-Khadem, & Mishkin,
2001). Recent neuroimaging work (Jackson & Schacter,
2004; Sperling, Chua, et al., 2003; Sperling, Bates, et al.,
2001; Henke, Weber, Kneifel, Wieser, & Buck, 1999) has
complemented these findings by demonstrating a role
for the hippocampus in binding together contextual
details into an associative recollection. Finally, although
hippocampal contributions to recognition memory in
nonhuman primates is still a matter of some debate
(Baxter & Murray, 2001a, 2001b; Zola & Squire, 2001),
lesion studies in rodents have generally demonstrated
the role of the hippocampus in contextual binding
processes of the kind that support recollection (Agster,
Fortin, & Eichenbaum, 2002; Fortin, Agster, & Eichen-
baum, 2002; Aggleton & Brown, 1999).
Given the strong consensus from earlier research that
the ventrolateral PFC and the hippocampus contribute
to memory by subserving encoding operations that
specifically support later recollection, results of the
current study support earlier psychological theories
regarding the cognitive processes required to avoid mis-
attribution errors. The present results indicated that the
‘‘neural signature’’ of successful recollective encoding—
the ventrolateral PFC and the hippocampus—also ac-
companied the encoding of items that were not later
subject to misattribution. That is, the illusory truth effect
was effectively minimized for items that were accompa-
nied by relatively stronger activation in regions known to
contribute to recollective encoding. In contrast, because
recollection does not necessarily accompany Fx, TT, or
Tx items (all of which could reflect the use of item
familiarity at test), such statements were, on average,
associated with less activation in the ventrolateral PFC
and the hippocampus.
Activations at Judgment
During the judgment phase, cued-false items were asso-
ciated with a pattern of neural activations previously
observed during recollection/source memory tasks. In
particular, we observed that activations in the bilateral
IFG, left SFG, and left posterior parietal regions were
greater for both FF and Fx items than for TT or Tx items.
These results overlap to a considerable extent with
several recent studies that have examined brain regions
in which activation was greater during attempts to
recollect specific source information than during item
recognition or other noncontextual retrieval tasks (Dob-
bins, Foley, et al., 2002; Eldridge et al., 2000; Ranganath,
Johnson, et al., 2000; Henson, Rugg, et al., 1999; Hen-
son, Shallice, et al., 1999; McDermott, Buckner, Peter-
sen, Kelley, & Sanders, 1999; Rugg et al., 1999; Nolde,
Johnson, & D’Esposito, 1998; Nolde, Johnson, & Raye,
1998; Wagner, Desmond, et al., 1998; Wagner, Poldrack,
et al., 1998; Petrides et al., 1995). Most notably, studies
by Dobbins and colleagues reported activations in the
left-lateralized SFG and the posterior parietal cortex and
along the extent of the left IFG when comparing source
recognition to item recognition (Dobbins, Foley, et al.,
2002) or to judgments of item recency, a task that does
not require reinstantiation of the study context (Dob-
bins, Rice, et al., 2003). A number of other studies have
also observed ventrolateral PFC activity during retrieval
(Ranganath, Johnson, et al., 2000; Rugg et al., 1999;
Nolde, Johnson, & D’Esposito, 1998; Wagner, Desmond,
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PFC accompanies a wide range of retrieval tasks (in-
cluding simple old/new recognition), left PFC activity
is likely to be observed during more complex or de-
manding retrieval tasks (Ranganath, Johnson, et al.,
2000; Nolde, Johnson, & D’Esposito, 1998; Nolde, John-
son, & Raye, 1998).
In addition, left-lateralized posterior parietal activa-
tions have also been reported at retrieval by several
authors (Wheeler & Buckner, 2004; Henson, Rugg, et al.,
1999) in comparisons of ‘‘remember’’ responses (which
are presumed to reflect recollective memory) and
‘‘know’’ responses (which are presumed to reflect
familiarity). Similar findings have been reported for a
source memory task versus simple old/new recognition
(Henson, Shallice, et al., 1999). Likewise, ‘‘remember’’
responses have also been associated with increased
activity in the left SFG (Henson, Rugg, et al., 1999).
Interestingly, the full set of fMRI data did not yield
evidence of a difference for FF > Fx. The lack of this
difference in the current study is consistent with most
event-related fMRI retrieval studies, which suggest that,
although cortical activity may be associated with retrieval
effort or mode, it does not typically track differences
between hits and misses (Dobbins, Rice, et al., 2003;
Dobbins, Foley, et al., 2002; Wagner, Desmond, et al.,
1998). However, when reaction times for FF and Fx trials
were equated, we effectively observed a retrieval success
effect (FF > Fx) located in the posterior parietal cortex.
Because most other retrieval studies have not controlled
for reaction time differences between hits and misses,
the generality of this parietal success effect is unknown.
However, it is consistent with the formulation of Pet-
rides and colleagues, who have suggested that, whereas
the frontal lobes initiate and maintain an active retrieval
mode, posterior cortical areas may actually subserve the
stored representations or preexisting associations that
comprise a successful recollection (Petrides et al., 1995).
Future research will be needed to test this possibility
directly.
Conclusions
In the current study, we identified a pattern of neural
activity associated with the successful encoding and
judgment of the truth of information. Our results are
consistent with earlier neuroimaging studies that have
identified brain regions in which activity was associated
either with (a) encoding of events in a manner that
supports later recovery of recollective details of the
study episode or (b) retrieval of such contextual infor-
mation. Against the backdrop of extant research, the
current study provides initial neuroimaging evidence
that the successful avoidance of misattribution—here
measured by suppression of the illusory truth effect—
relies on the use of contextual recollection that may
oppose other memory processes (e.g., item familiarity).
These kinds of misattribution errors have clear impli-
cations for day-to-day cognition. The difficulty posed by
attempts to ignore or disregard information is well
known outside the laboratory setting; indeed, trial law-
yers and judges often go to great lengths to instruct
juries to discount evidence or testimony inappropriately
admitted into a case. Notwithstanding, a sizeable body of
psychological research demonstrates that jury decisions
can nevertheless be heavily influenced by inadmissible
evidence even after repeated instructions to disregard
such information (Kassin & Studebaker, 1998). Similarly,
perceivers have been shown to persist in using experi-
mentally provided information to make causal attribu-
tions or judgments about their own abilities (Anderson,
Lepper, & Ross, 1980; Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975),
even after debriefing procedures expose the fictitious
nature of the information. In the current work, we
investigate the neural basis of this class of memory
failure and, in doing so, provide converging evidence
for earlier, cognitive accounts of misattribution.
METHODS
Participants
Participants were 12 (6 women; mean age: 21 years,
range: 18–27) right-handed, native English speakers
with no history of neurological problems. Informed con-
sent was obtained in a manner approved by the Hu-
man Studies Committee of the Massachusetts General
Hospital.
Stimuli and Behavioral Procedure
Stimuli consisted of 296 ‘‘trivia’’ statements (Bacon,
1979) with which participants were unlikely to be famil-
iar, for instance, ‘‘It takes 4 hours to hard boil an ostrich
egg.’’ Half of the statements were factually true; the
remaining half were rendered false by changing one
piece of information, for example, ‘‘It takes 6 hours to
hard boil an ostrich egg.’’ On each encoding trial, a
statement was presented for 5500 msec below one of
the cue words, True, False,o rNeutral. In each of two
functional runs, an equal number of the statements were
cued as true, false, or neutral (111 total statements per
run). Across participants, statements were randomly
cued as true, false, or neutral, regardless of their actual
truth value. Participants were instructed to memorize
each statement and whether it was true or false (for
cued-neutral statements, participants were instructed to
encode the statement only). To ensure they were at-
tending to the task, participants were required to re-
spond to each statement by pressing a different button
for each of the three cue words.
During the truth judgment phase of the experiment,
participants viewed 222 old statements presented ran-
domly among 74 novel statements. On each trial, par-
Mitchell, Dodson, and Schacter 807ticipants saw a statement presented below a 5-point
scale that read: 1 = definitely false; 2 = probably false;
3 = neither true nor false; 4 = probably true; 5 =
definitely true. Participants judged the statements for
how true or false they believed each to be (or pressed 3
if they did not have a basis for judging its veracity).
Instructions underscored that participants should use
their feelings about how true or false each statement
seemed but did not explicitly warn against intentionally
revisiting the study phase. The scale and statement
remained onscreen together for 5500 msec. Trials on
which participants failed to respond within this window
were excluded from all statistical analyses (< 5% of
trials). During both phases, trials were separated by a
variable interstimulus interval (500–5500 msec) that was
used to optimize estimation of the event-related fMRI
response (Dale, 1999). During interstimulus intervals,
participants passively viewed a fixation crosshair.
Imaging Procedure
Imaging was conducted using a 3-T Siemens Allegra
scanner. Functional scanning used a gradient-echo
echo-planar pulse sequence (TR, 2 sec; TE, 40 msec;
3.75  3.75 in-plane resolution). The encoding (433
acquisitions per run) and judgment (544 acquisitions)
phases of the experiment each consisted of two func-
tional runs (21 slices aligned to AC–PC; 5 mm thick;
1 mm skip). Stimuli were projected onto a screen at the
end of the magnet bore that participants viewed by way
of a mirror mounted on the head coil. A pillow and foam
cushions were placed inside the head coil to minimize
head movements.
fMRI data were preprocessed and analyzed using
SPM99 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology,
London, UK). First, functional data were time-corrected
for differences in acquisition time between slices for
each whole-brain volume and realigned to correct for
head movement. Functional data were then transformed
into a standard anatomical space (3-mm isotropic vox-
els) on the basis of the ICBM 152 brain template
(Montreal Neurological Institute), which approximates
Talairach and Tournoux atlas space. Normalized data
were then spatially smoothed (8 mm full width at half
maximum) using a Gaussian kernel.
Statistical analyses were performed using the general
linear model in which the event-related design was
modeled using a canonical hemodynamic response
function and its temporal derivative (temporal deriva-
tives were included to account for variability associated
with differences in the onset of the hemodynamic
response, but were not analyzed further). Comparisons
of interest were implemented using a random-effects
model. A voxel-based statistical threshold of p < .001
was used for all comparisons; ROIs were required to
exceed 23 contiguous voxels in extent (providing an
alpha level of p < .05, corrected) for contrasts of all
experimental task trials over fixation baseline, (e.g., all
encoding trials > fixation) and 10 contiguous voxels
(i.e., p < .001, uncorrected) for direct comparisons
between conditions (e.g., FF > TT). Peristimulus hemo-
dynamic time courses for each of these ROIs were
extracted on a subject-by-subject basis using a selective
averaging procedure (R. A. Poldrack, University of Cal-
ifornia Los Angeles). Statistical comparisons between
conditions were conducted using analysis of variance
(ANOVA) procedures on the parameter estimates asso-
ciated with each trial type ( p < .05).
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Note
1. Moreover, the current design did not permit an unambig-
uous determination of whether a cued-neutral item was sub-
sequently judged correctly. Participants could indicate that a
cued-neutral item was ‘‘neither true nor false’’ either because
they successfully recollected the original cue or, conversely,
because of the complete absence of memory (i.e., believing
that the item was being seen for the first time). As such, cued-
neutral items that were judged ‘‘neither true nor false’’
comprised a heterogeneous set that precluded appropriate
neuroimaging comparisons. We reiterate that, because earlier
cognitive research has suggested that recollection should not
play a critical role in misattributions for cued-neutral items,
fMRI analysis of these items was not relevant to the predictions
outlined in the current study. The inclusion of cued-neutral
statements was only critical for ensuring correspondence with
previous work by confirming that we obtained both behavioral
markers of the illusory truth effect.
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